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Summary: In its aim to become a global security actor, the EU is in-
creasingly undertaking civilian and military crisis missions all over 
the world. These missions are based on the European security and 
defence policy (ESDP) which forms an integral part of its common for-
eign and security policy (CFSP). The Treaty of Lisbon seems to mirror 
the Union’s global security ambitions as it addresses the European 
security and defence policy in a whole new treaty section. However, 
European missions still depend on willing Member States to make ci-
vilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the imple-
mentation of its security and defence policy. The purpose of this article 
is to examine the relationship between the European Union  and the 
Member States in the ﬁ eld of the common foreign and security policy 
and the European security and defence policy and whether the Treaty 
of Lisbon manages to clarify the situation. What constraints, if any, do 
the common foreign and security policy and the European security and 
defence policy impose on the Member States regarding the conduct of 
their national foreign policy? The article argues that the relationship 
between the EU and the Member States can only be determined after 
an examination of the binding nature of primary and secondary CFSP 
law as well as of international agreements concluded by the Union.
I. Introduction
In its aim to become a global security actor, the EU is increasingly 
undertaking civilian and military crisis missions all over the world. These 
operations include police missions,1 rule of law missions,2 border assist-
ance missions,3 missions in support of security sector reforms,4 monitor-
* PhD candidate, University of Edingburgh.
1  See for example EU Police Mission in Afghanistan, EUPOL AFGHANISTAN, Council Joint 
Action 2008/229/CFSP of 17 March 2008.
2  See for example the EU rule of law mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO, Council Joint 
Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 2008.
3  See for example the EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the Pales-
tinian Territories EU BAM Rafah, Council Joint Action 2007/359/CFSP of 23 May 2007.
4  See for example the EU mission in support of security sector reform in Guinea-Bissau, 
EU SSR Guinea-Bissau, Council Joint Action 2008/112/CFSP of 12 February 2008.
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ing missions5 and military missions,6 and are based on the European 
Union’s security and defence policy (ESDP)7 which forms an integral part 
of its common foreign and security policy (CFSP). The function of the 
European security and defence policy is to make the common foreign 
and security policy operational. One of the motives for the drafting of 
the Treaty of Lisbon was to enhance the coherence and effectiveness of 
the Union’s external action and in particular to provide the EU with the 
military capability to implement its civilian aims and objectives. At ﬁ rst 
glance, the Treaty of Lisbon seems to mirror the Union’s global security 
ambitions, as it is expands the range of the so-called ‘Petersberg tasks’. 
Joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, con-
ﬂ ict prevention and peace-keeping tasks as well as post-conﬂ ict stabilisa-
tion are added8 to the already possible humanitarian and rescue tasks, 
peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, 
including peacemaking.9 Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon addresses 
the European security and defence policy in a whole new treaty section, 
putting more emphasis on its scope. In consequence, the European Un-
ion appears to be more prepared than ever to take on responsibility on 
the international scene in order to promote democracy, the rule of law 
and respect for human rights. However, European missions still depend 
on the Member States making civilian and military capabilities available 
to the Union for the implementation of its security and defence policy 
(Article 42 (3) TEU Lisbon version). Thus, the effectiveness and efﬁ ciency 
of the EU’s external action depends on the Union’s relationship with its 
Member States.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between 
the European Union and the European Member States in the ﬁ eld of 
the common foreign and security policy and the European security and 
defence policy and whether the Treaty of Lisbon manages to clarify the 
situation. What constraints, if any, do the common foreign and security 
policy and the European security and defence policy impose on the Mem-
ber States regarding the conduct of their national foreign and security 
policy?  Related to this overall problem are several sub-questions. Is the 
CFSP purely intergovernmental? Are the Member States just utilising the 
CFSP structure to pursue their domestic policies? Has there been some 
5  See for example Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), Council Joint Action 2005/643/CFSP 
of 9 September 2005.
6  See for example operation EUFOR in Chad, Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP of 15 
October 2007.
7  The Treaty of Lisbon will rename the European security and defence policy as the com-
mon security and defence policy.
8  Article 43 (1) TEU Lisbon version.
9  Article 17 TEU Nice version.
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transfer of power from the Member States to the European Union? Has 
the CFSP developed into more than just the sum of the Member States? 
Have the Member States become semi-sovereign subjects? The answers 
to these questions are not identical, but they will help in approaching the 
overall problem of whether the Member States are constrained by the EU 
in the sphere of the CFSP and the ESDP.
The main emphasis of the paper is on an examination of the com-
mon foreign and security policy. This is due to the fact that the European 
security and defence policy forms an integral part of the common foreign 
and security policy. The European security and defence policy does not 
have its own instruments to pursue its aims and objectives and therefore 
has to rely on the instruments of the Union’s common foreign and securi-
ty policy. Furthermore, ESDP missions have to be in line with the overall 
objectives and principles of the CFSP.10 The main argument of the paper 
is that the relationship between the European Union and the Member 
States in the sphere of the common foreign and security policy, as well as 
in the sphere of the European security and defence policy, has to be de-
termined through an analysis of the binding nature of primary and sec-
ondary CFSP law as well as of international agreements concluded by the 
European Union. As these treaty provisions are the same for the common 
foreign and security policy and the European defence and security policy, 
the paper argues that the relationship between the European Union and 
the Member States in the sphere of the common foreign and security 
policy and the European security and defence policy is the same.
In order to examine if the European Member States are constrained 
by the common foreign and security policy in the conduct of their na-
tional foreign policy, the next section will discuss if it is useful to ap-
proach this problem by asking if the common foreign and security policy 
is purely intergovernmental soft law. One could argue that if the common 
foreign and security policy has stopped being purely intergovernmental, 
the Member States must have transferred some of their powers to the 
Union. In consequence, the Union must have developed into more than 
just the sum of its Member States and they have to be constrained by 
the common foreign and security policy. The third section will analyse if 
the attribution of the European Union with international legal personal-
ity could indicate that there has been some transfer of powers from the 
Member States to the EU. The fourth section will examine whether pri-
mary and secondary CFSP law is binding on the Member States. Special 
emphasis will be put on the principles of systematic cooperation and loyal 
10  M Ortega, ‘Beyond Petersberg Missions for the EU Military Forces’ in N Gnesotto (ed), EU 
Security and Defence Policy: The First Five Years (1999-2004) (Institute for Security Studies, 
European Union, Paris 2004)   76.
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cooperation, as well as on joint actions and common positions. The last 
part will focus on the constraints international agreements concluded by 
the European Union might impose on the Member States. 
II. CFSP as purely intergovernmental soft law? 
Usually, the common foreign and security policy and the Europe-
an security and defence policy under the Nice Treaty are described as 
intergovernmental in nature,11 in contrast to the supranational European 
Community. But what is the label ‘intergovernmental’ supposed to indi-
cate? It usually refers to the method that led to the creation of the CFSP. 
The common foreign and security policy that developed outside the treaty 
framework and became legalised through the Treaty of Maastricht started 
as a form of intergovernmental cooperation between the Member States. 
In the high-political ﬁ eld of foreign and security policy, the European 
Member States chose to work together but they have not been willing to 
transfer their sovereignty and use the Community law method. Using 
a legal framework based on international law did not seem to threaten 
their sovereign powers.12 In the context of the European Union, the term 
‘intergovernmental’ is used not only to refer to the origins of the com-
mon foreign and security policy but to stress the differences between 
the common foreign and security policy and the supranational European 
Community.13 Although there are several views on what constitutes a su-
pranational system,14 they usually include the capacity for autonomous 
decision making, the capacity to adopt legally binding rules by quali-
ﬁ ed majority voting, judicial enforcement mechanisms and parliamentary 
control, as well as ﬁ nancial autonomy.15  One of the key elements that 
turn the European Community into a supranational system has been the 
transfer of sovereignty from the Member States to the Community. Some 
who describe the CFSP as intergovernmental soft law thus use the term 
to indicate that the European Member States are not constrained in the 
conduct of their national foreign policy by the CFSP, as a transfer of sov-
ereignty to the European Union would never have taken place. Implied 
in this statement is the view that the CFSP is purely governed by the 
11  See for instance W Wagner, ‘Why the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy Will 
Remain Intergovernmental: A Rationalist Institutional Choice Analysis of European Crisis 
Management Policy’ (2003) 10:4 Journal of European Public Policy 589; E Denza, The Inter-
governmental Pillars of the European Union (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002).
12  E Denza, The Intergovernmental Pillars of the European Union (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2002) 5.
13  M R Eaton, ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ in D O’Keeffee and P M Twomey (eds), 
Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty (Chancery Law Publishing Ltd, Chichester 1994) 216.
14  G Bono, ‘Some Reﬂ ections on the CFSP Legal Order’ (2006) 43 CML Rev 357.
15  See Bono (n 14) 357.
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working methods and principles of general international law.16 The term 
‘soft law’ in this context is used to indicate that Union competence in the 
sphere of the CFSP does not exist and that the CFSP forum is used by 
the Member States to exercise their national foreign and security compe-
tences. Those who recognise a change in the nature of the CFSP might 
look for supranational elements in the overall intergovernmental CFSP17 
and argue that the CFSP stopped being purely intergovernmental.  
However, it is doubtful whether labelling the CFSP as purely-inter-
governmental, intergovernmental or as soft law adds much value to the 
examination of the Union’s relationship with its Member States. The de-
velopment of the CFSP started in intergovernmental conferences and even 
today it is driven by an intergovernmental setting. The European Council 
deﬁ nes the principles and general guidelines of the CFSP (Article 13 TEU 
Nice version). Secondary CFSP provisions are adopted by the Council 
(Articles 14, 15 TEU Nice version). Nevertheless, an intergovernmental 
setting does not necessarily lead to the outcome of these meetings be-
ing of an intergovernmental nature. Besides, the term intergovernmental 
cannot denote a non-biding character as such. Although international 
law largely lacks enforcement mechanisms and is thus often labelled soft 
law in contrast to hard law, international law is still law after all.18 Fur-
thermore, no agreement exists on how soft law should be deﬁ ned. Some 
claim that soft law is non-law19 while others assume that soft law can be 
found at the mid point of two extremes, between hard law and purely po-
litical arrangements, and that many varieties of soft law exist. According 
to the latter view, soft law is the result of legal arrangements that have 
been weakened along at least one of the dimensions of obligation, preci-
sion and delegation.20 Overall, qualifying the common foreign and secu-
rity policy as soft law or as intergovernmental does not add much value 
in answering the question whether the Member States are constrained by 
the common foreign and security policy.  In fact, it represents a different 
type of argument, looking at the decision-making process and not at the 
binding legal character of the common foreign and security policy. The 
latter problem, which can only be solved by interpreting the provisions of 
the common foreign and security policy itself, is the focus of this paper. 
16  See Bono (n 14) 338.
17  See Wagner (n 11) 585, 589.
18  The obligatory nature of international law is sometimes based on the theory of natural 
law, on consent or on socialist theory, for example. See K Ipsen, Völkerrecht (5th edn CH 
Beck, München 2004) 7-17.
19  D Shelton, ‘Law, Non-Law and the Problem of “Soft Law”’ in D Shelton (ed), Commitment 
and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2000) 4.
20  KW Abbott and D Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’ (2000) 54 
International Organization 422.
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Hence, the question should not to be whether the CFSP represents inter-
governmental soft law, but rather to what extent the common foreign and 
security policy is binding and what the nature of its binding character 
is: is it binding in a legal sense or in a political sense, or is it binding in 
both senses? If the CFSP is binding on the Member States, they must be 
constrained in the conduct of their national foreign policy. They must 
have transferred some of their powers to the Union in the ﬁ eld of common 
foreign and security policy which in turn has developed into more than 
just the sum of its Member States. However, one has to bear in mind that 
the possible conclusion that the common foreign and security policy is 
binding on the Member States does not necessarily lead to the common 
foreign policy being supranational.  
III. Legal personality of the European Union 
The legal personality of the European Union could speak in favour of 
the argument that the European Union is more than just the sum of its 
Member States and that the Member States are constrained by the EU in 
the ﬁ eld of CFSP as some transfer of power must have taken place. Legal 
personality is conceived as the ability to exercise certain rights and to 
fulﬁ l certain obligations.21 A legal person is independent of its members 
and acts through its organs. These organs have the ability to issue norms 
and rules.22 If the European Union could be qualiﬁ ed as a legal person, it 
would have to be distinct from its Member States. Hence, they must have 
transferred some of their powers to the Union as otherwise it would not 
possess the capacity to create rights and obligations. 
It is important to distinguish legal personality from legal capacity. 
The former refers to being a subject of international law, whereas the lat-
ter describes what the legal entity is entitled to do.23 Only states as born 
subjects of international law enjoy general legal capacity. International 
organisations, on the other hand, can have legal personality.24 If they do, 
their legal capacity is, however, circumscribed by the competences the 
states have created for them in their founding treaties.25 In contrast to 
21  R Wessel, ‘The Inside Looking Out: Consistency and Delimitation in EU External Rela-
tions’ (2000) 37 CML Rev 1140.
22  D Curtin, I Dekker, ‘The EU as a “Layered” International Organization: Institutional 
unity in Disguise’ in  P Craig and G de Burca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford 1999) 95.
23  RA Wessel, ‘The International Legal Status of the European Union’ (1997) 2 European 
Foreign Affairs Review 111.
24  D Verwey, The European Community, the European Union and the International Law of 
Treaties: A Comparative Legal Analysis of the Community and the Union’s External Treaty-
Making Practice (TMC Asser Press, The Hague 2004) 59.
25  See Wessel (n 23) 111.
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states, they do not have the competence to create and invent new compe-
tences for themselves. 
The Treaty of Lisbon, merging the pillars of the European Union and 
leading to the replacement of the European Community with the European 
Union (Article 1 TEU Lisbon version) now states that the ‘Union shall have 
legal personality’ (Article 47 TEU Lisbon version). But one can wonder if 
the Treaty of Lisbon is granting international legal personality to the Euro-
pean Union in the ﬁ eld of common foreign and security policy for the ﬁ rst 
time or if it is merely formalising the Union’s implied legal personality. The 
Treaty of Nice makes no explicit reference to the legal personality of the 
European Union. As the EC Treaty entails special provisions in respect of 
the European Community’s internal (Article 282 EC) as well as its inter-
national legal personality (Article 281 EC Treaty), one could deny the legal 
personality of the European Union as an actus contrarius argument. 
In order to assess whether the European Union can be attributed 
with international legal personality that is independent of the legal per-
sonality of the European Communities,26 two questions have to be dis-
tinguished. The question whether the EU could enjoy independent legal 
personality depends on the systematic relationship between the different 
pillars of the European Union. Three scenarios are possible. The pillars 
could either form a complete unity27 or they could be completely separate 
from each other. Lastly, the Union could form a legal entity with legal 
sub-systems.28 According to the unity thesis, the European Union would 
be one single organisation with one legal personality29and hence the EU 
could not be attributed with international legal personality that is inde-
pendent of the legal personality of the European Communities. However, 
if the EC and EU treaties formed separate orders or if they formed legal 
sub-orders of one legal system, the EU could still enjoy independent legal 
personality. Those who argue in favour of the European Union being a 
single legal system,30 consisting of all the treaties and secondary law,31 
26  EC and Euratom.
27  A von Bogdandy, ‘The Legal Case for Unity: The European Union as a Single Organiza-
tion with a Single Legal System’ (1999) 36 CML Rev 889; A von Bogdandy and M Netteshe-
im, ‘Ex Pluribus Unum: Fusion of the European Communities into the European Union’ 
(1996) 2 ELJ 268.
28  D Curtin, I Dekker, ‘The EU as a “Layered” International Organization: Institutional 
Unity in Disguise’ in P Craig and G de Burca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford 1999) 86.
29  See  von Bogdandy and  Nettesheim (n 27) 284.
30  See von Bogdandy (n 27) 268; A Tizzano, ‘The Foreign Relations Law of the EU Between 
Supranationality and Intergovernmental Model’ in  E Canizzaro (ed), The European Union as 
an Actor in International Relations (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2002) 144.
31  See von Bogdandy (n 27) 887. 
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usually refer to the Airport Transit Visa case32 in which the ECJ found 
itself to be competent to annul a TEU measure insofar as it encroached 
upon Community competences.33 However, the unity thesis fails to ex-
plain the different roles of the institutions played under the pillars, for 
example, and thus has to be rejected. On the other hand, the theory of 
strict separation of the pillars cannot explain the reference to the single 
institutional framework of the Union (Article 3 TEU) and the amendment 
of the Treaties and accession to the Union as a whole (Articles 48, 49 
TEU).34 Only the theory that regards the European Union as one legal 
entity consisting of legal sub-systems seems to be capable of avoiding 
the obstacle the other two extreme positions face. Hence, the European 
Union contains two legal personalities - namely the EC and Euratom. 
Each legal sub-system is guided by its own rules and procedures, and the 
European Union could be attributed with international legal personality 
that is independent of the legal personality of the European Communi-
ties. Whether or not the European Union enjoys international legal per-
sonality will be examined below.
The EU could be an international legal person if it were granted com-
petences that can only be inherited by an international legal person,35 as 
established in the Reparation for Injuries case36 by the ICJ. Such func-
tions could include the conclusion of agreements. Since the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, the Union has the capacity to conclude international agree-
ments. As Article 24 TEU has to be interpreted in connection with Article 
18 (I) TEU, stating that the Presidency represents the Union and not the 
Member States, agreements of Article 24 TEU are concluded by the EU 
itself and not by the Council on behalf of the Member States.37 So far, the 
Council has concluded three types of international agreements in rela-
tion to the conduct of ESDP missions, including the status of mission 
and status of force agreements with the host state, agreements with third 
parties, contributing personnel or assets and ﬁ nally agreements regulat-
ing the exchange of information.38 As a consequence of its treaty-making 
32  Case C-170/96 Commission v Council [1998] European Court Reports I-2763.
33  C Herrmann, ‘Much Ado about Pluto? The “Unity of the Legal Order of the European 
Union” Revisited’ in M Cremona and B De Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law: Consti-
tutional Fundamentals: Essays in European Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, 
Oregon 2008) 26.
34  See C Herrmann (n 33) 25; A Tizzano (n 30) 143.
35  D McGoldrick, International Relations of the EU (Longman, London and New York 1997) 
37.
36  Reparation for Injuries (1949) ICJ Rep 174.
37  P Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union: Legal and Constitutional Founda-
tions (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004) 158-159.
38  A Sari, ‘The Conclusion of International Agreements by the European Union in the Con-
text of the ESDP’ (2008) 57 ICLQ 55.
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power, objective reality suggests that the EU already has implied interna-
tional legal personality. Legal personality does not depend on recognition 
by others.39 Hence, the Lisbon Treaty is merely formalising the EU’s legal 
capacity to act.
But can the legal personality of the European Union really support 
the thesis that the European Union in the sphere of the common foreign 
and security policy is more than just the sum of its Member States and 
that the Member States might be constrained by the Union? Declaration 
No 24 annexed to the Lisbon Treaty, concerning the legal personality 
of the European Union, mirrors the fear of the Member States that the 
granting of legal personality to the Union could amount to a loss of sov-
ereignty, as it states that the Union’s ‘legal personality will not in any 
way authorise the Union to legislate or to act beyond the competences 
conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties’. However, the 
general capacity of the European Union to have rights and to be under 
obligations is a necessary, although not sufﬁ cient, element to argue in 
favour of the possibility that the EU is more than just the sum of its Mem-
ber States and that the Member States could be constrained by the Union 
in the ﬁ eld of the CFSP. The legal personality of the European Union is 
merely the ﬁ rst step to argue that the Union is an entity distinct from its 
Member States. However, even if the EU can be seen as an entity vis-à-vis 
its Member States, this does not answer the question about if or when 
the Member States are constrained by the CFSP. The legal personality 
of the European Union merely indicates that it has the capacity to have 
rights and to be under obligations in general, but it does not indicate 
which competences it has in reality. The European Union can only have 
competences that have been either explicitly attributed to it through the 
founding treaty or according to the doctrine of implied powers. However, 
implied powers only exist when they are necessary for the exercise of ex-
press powers.40
Furthermore, the creation of an international organisation and the 
attribution of this organisation with certain competences do not neces-
sarily imply that the members of this organisation have completely trans-
ferred some of their powers or competences to this organisation and are 
now prevented from exercising these powers themselves. One could think 
of two alternatives. First, the members could have created parallel com-
petences for this organisation or, second, they could have delegated the 
exercise of these competences to this organisation without losing their 
39  R Higgins, Problems and Process: International law and how we use it (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 1994) 47, 48.
40  Dissenting opinion by Judge Hackworth, Reparation for Injuries (1949) ICJ Rep 174, 
198.
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own competences. That the latter scenario is usually the case can be il-
lustrated by the unique case of the European Community. The Member 
States transferred some of their sovereignty to the Community and are 
no longer competent to act in areas where the EC has acquired exclusive 
competence. The Community institutions in turn can adopt binding deci-
sions. These criteria have contributed to the supranational character of 
the European Community which is the only supranational international 
organisation so far. But even if one claimed that by creating the Euro-
pean Union and the CFSP the Member States have transferred some of 
their sovereignty to the EU, it would still be necessary to analyse what as-
pects of their sovereignty have been transferred. The ﬁ nding that the EU 
has legal personality and thus can create rights and obligations in theory 
does not specify which rights and obligations it has in reality41 as this is 
a question of the scope of the legal capacity of the Union in the sphere of 
the common foreign and security policy.
In sum, the explicit granting of legal personality to the European 
Union in the Treaty of Lisbon does not bring us any closer to answer-
ing the question whether the European Member States are constrained 
by the Union’s common foreign and security policy or the European se-
curity and defence policy. It can merely serve as a positive signal to the 
global community regarding the Union’s capability to act.42 The question 
whether the Member States are constrained by the common foreign and 
security policy can only be answered by analysing the binding nature of 
primary and secondary CFSP provisions and international agreements 
concluded by the Union in the sphere of the CFSP.
IV. The binding nature of CFSP law
The following section examines whether the Member States are bound 
by the Union’s common foreign and security policy. The ﬁ rst part looks at 
primary CFSP law, highlighting the principles of systematic cooperation 
and the principle of loyal cooperation. The next part focuses on second-
ary CFSP provisions with its main focus on decisions formerly known as 
joint actions and common positions. The constraints that international 
agreements concluded by the Union might impose on the Member States 
are analysed in part three. 
41  E Paasivirta, ‘The European Union: From an Aggregate of States to a Legal Person?’ 
(1997) 2 Hofstra Law & Policy Symposium 54.
42  W Wessels and F Bopp, ‘The Institutional Architecture of CFSP after the Lisbon Treaty - 
Constitutional Breakthrough or Challenges Ahead?’ (2008) Research Paper No 10 Challenge 
- The Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security <http://www.ceps.eu> 11.
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A. The binding nature of primary CFSP law
An analysis of the binding nature of primary EU law will focus on the 
principle of systematic cooperation and the principle of loyal cooperation. 
The Treaty of Lisbon introduces some modest changes in respect of these 
principles.
The principle of systematic cooperation
The principle of systematic cooperation states that the Member 
States ‘shall consult one another within the European Council and the 
Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in 
order to determine a common approach’ (Article 32 TEU Lisbon version). 
The wording of Article 32 TEU, like the wording of Article 16 TEU Nice 
version indicates through the use of the word ‘shall’ that the Member 
States are under the obligation to inform and consult each other. One of 
the minor changes Article 32 TEU will bring is the removal of the explicit 
obligation for the Member States to inform one another on any matter of 
general interest. However, as consultation between the Member States is 
only possible after information has taken place, the obligation to inform 
seems to be contained in the obligation to consult each other. Thus, the 
scope of the principle of systematic cooperation has not been limited by 
the Treaty of Lisbon.
What does the obligation of consultation entail? In international 
law, the obligation of consultation comprises the duty to avoid a position 
being taken before the matter has been discussed with the other part-
ners.43 Article 32 TEU does not indicate any deviation from this concept 
of consultation. As a result, the principle of systematic cooperation as 
expressed in Article 32 TEU entails the negative obligation for the Mem-
ber States not to go public with a domestic position on CFSP matters of 
general interest before the matter has been discussed within the CFSP 
framework ﬁ rst.44  This interpretation of Article 32 TEU is supported by 
the systematic relationship with Article 24 (3) TEU, entailing the principle 
of loyal cooperation, which will be addressed in the next section. 
But in what circumstances are the Member States under the obli-
gation to consult each other? Matters of foreign and security policy of 
‘general interest’ seems to be a very broad category. General interest sup-
posedly goes beyond purely national interests. But who deﬁ nes what gen-
eral interest is? The wording of Article 32 sentence 1 TEU, like the old 
43  C Hillion and R Wessel, ‘Restraining External Competences of EU Member States under 
CFSP’ in M Cremona and B De Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Funda-
mentals: Essays in European Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2008) 82.
44 See Hillion and Wessel (n 43) 82.
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interpretation of Article 16 TEU Nice version suggests that it is deﬁ ned by 
the Member States, which would therefore limit the content of the obliga-
tion.45 However, in contrast to Article 16 TEU Nice version, which states 
that the duty to inform and to consult exists ‘in order to ensure that the 
Union’s inﬂ uence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of con-
certed and convergent action’, Article 32 TEU now contains the sentence 
that the Member States ‘shall ensure, through the convergence of their 
actions, that the Union is able to assert its interest and values on the in-
ternational scene’. The new wording, probably in line with the granting of 
legal personality to the EU (Article 47 TEU Lisbon version), thus speaks 
in favour of determining matters of foreign and security policy of general 
interest not from the perspective of the Member States but from the per-
spective of the European Union. The Lisbon Treaty therefore stresses the 
importance of the principle of systematic cooperation. However, as the 
Member States in practice can still prevent topics from being placed on 
the agenda of the Union, the impact of the new wording will be limited. In 
sum, when a topic of foreign and security policy of general interest to the 
Union is concerned, the Member States are not free to act as they please 
but are under the obligation to consult one another in the forum of the 
Union in order to ensure a common approach. 
The principle of loyal cooperation
Related to the principle of loyal cooperation, Article 24 (3) TEU Lis-
bon version repeats in its ﬁ rst part the wording of Article 11 (2) TEU 
Nice version and is more speciﬁ c than the general obligation for Member 
States to fulﬁ l treaty obligations and to observe the principle of sincere 
cooperation as expressed in Article 4 (3) TEU Lisbon version.46 Article 24 
(3) TEU Lisbon version lays down that the Member States 
shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and 
unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall 
comply with the Union’s action in this area. The Member States shall 
work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidar-
ity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the in-
terests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive 
force in international relations. 
Through the use of the term ‘shall’, the wording indicates that the 
Member States are obliged to act loyally and to cooperate. The mandatory 
character is underlined through the requirement that the Member States 
have to support the Union’s policy ‘actively’ and ‘unreservedly’. 
45  See Hillion and Wessel (n 43) 81.
46  See Wessels and Bopp (n 42) 12. 
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The loyalty obligation involves a positive as well as a negative obli-
gation. The positive obligation asks the Member States to actively work 
together to enhance and develop the Union’s external and security policy. 
The negative obligation requests the Member States to refrain from any 
action which runs counter to the interests of the EU or which is likely to 
infringe its effectiveness. The only innovation in relation to the principle 
of loyal cooperation through the Lisbon Treaty is the amendment that 
the Member States ‘shall comply with the Union’s action’ in the area of 
external and security policy (Article 24 (3) TEU Lisbon version). However, 
this amendment relates to the already expressed positive as well as nega-
tive obligations of the Member States in the context of loyal cooperation, 
without giving them a new meaning but rather putting more emphasis 
on their importance. In sum, the loyalty obligation as expressed in the 
Lisbon Treaty thus stresses the Member States’ obligation to respect the 
Union’s CFSP acquis and to refrain from unilateral action that could un-
dermine the Union’s common foreign and security interests. 
In comparison with the Treaty of Nice, the Lisbon Treaty introduces 
modest changes in respect of the principle of systematic cooperation and 
the loyalty obligation. Nevertheless, the changes that have been made 
put more emphasis on the need for the Member States to consider the 
Union’s common foreign and security policy before they undertake their 
domestic foreign policy. The real signiﬁ cance of the binding nature of 
primary CFSP provisions will become visible in conjunction with second-
ary CFSP provisions. When the Member States reach a solution in the 
Council, and the Council adopts a Union decision, the principle of sys-
tematic cooperation and the loyalty obligation underline and enhance the 
Member States’ obligation to conduct their national foreign policy in line 
with the Union’s common foreign and security policy. In other words, the 
Member States are constrained in the conduct of their national policy by 
secondary CFSP provisions in conjunction with the principles of primary 
CFSP law. In this respect, the principle of loyal cooperation, contain-
ing the positive obligation for the Member States to actively support the 
Union’s foreign and security policy, as well as the negative obligation 
to refrain from any action that might run counter to the Union’s CFSP 
acquis, seems to be of greater signiﬁ cance than the principle of sincere 
cooperation that asks the Member States to consult one another in order 
to ensure a Union decision. The next part goes on to assess the binding 
nature of secondary CFSP provisions.
B. The binding nature of secondary CFSP law
In order to pursue the objectives of a common foreign and security 
policy, the Treaty of Nice mentions ﬁ ve different instruments, consisting 
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of the deﬁ nition of the principles of and general guidelines for the com-
mon foreign and security policy, common strategies, joint actions, a com-
mon position and the strengthening of systematic cooperation between 
the Member States (Article 12 TEU Nice version). Over the past few years, 
practice has also led to the development of decisions sui generis. Addi-
tionally, there is the possibility of the conclusion of international agree-
ments (Article 24 TEU Nice version). The Lisbon Treaty introduces some 
modest changes. The instruments to implement the CFSP do not include 
common strategies. The terms common positions and joint actions have 
been deleted but the instruments as such still exist. The next section ex-
amines if secondary CFSP provisions are binding on the Member States. 
The emphasis will be on joint actions and common positions. 
Joint actions / Council decisions deﬁ ning actions to be undertaken 
by the Union
The Lisbon Treaty replaces the instrument of joint actions that 
‘shall address speciﬁ c situations where operational action by the Un-
ion is deemed to be required’ (Article 14 TEU Nice version) with Council 
decisions where ‘the international situation requires operational action’ 
(Article 28 TEU Lisbon version). In order to ﬁ nd out whether Council deci-
sions deﬁ ning actions to be undertaken by the Union are legally binding, 
the wording of Article 28 TEU, its systematic context, and its underly-
ing rationale have to be analysed. The wording of Article 28 TEU Lisbon 
version only slightly deviates from the wording of Article 14 TEU Nice 
version. According to Article 28 (2) TEU, joint actions shall commit the 
Member States in the position they adopt in the conduct of their activ-
ity. The use of the word ‘shall’ indicates the binding character in respect 
of the Member States and their conduct of national foreign policy. This 
reasoning is supported by the systematic relationship of Article 28 (2) 
TEU with paragraph 1, second subparagraph, and paragraphs 4 and 5 
of the same Article. Paragraph 1, subparagraph 2 states that even when 
there has been a substantial change of circumstances underlying such 
a decision, ‘the Council shall review the principles and objectives of that 
decision and take the necessary decisions’. Thus, it is for the Council to 
adopt a new decision and until then the Member States are bound by the 
old decision. It is in this respect that the Treaty of Nice is more supportive 
of the binding nature of joint actions than the Treaty of Lisbon, as Article 
14 (2) TEU Nice version states that the joint action shall stand as long as 
the Council has not acted. However, the wording of Article 28 TEU is still 
clear enough to conclude that Article 28 (1) subparagraph 2 TEU does not 
allow the Member States to invoke a radical change of circumstances in 
order to pursue their national foreign policy. Instead, it is for the Council 
to decide what should be done. However, paragraph 4 allows a Member 
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State, in the case of imperative need arising from a change in situa-
tion and after failing to obtain a new Council decision, to take necessary 
measures as a matter of urgency, accompanied by the duty of immedi-
ately informing the Council. Apart from this provision which seems to be 
the only exception from the binding nature of an operational decision,47 a 
Member State facing difﬁ culties in implementing a joint action is asked to 
address the Council in order for it to seek an appropriate solution (Article 
28 (5) TEU). In sum, the wording of Article 28 (2) TEU and its systematic 
context suggests the binding nature of operational decisions in respect of 
the Member States. 
Common positions / Union positions
According to Article 29 TEU Lisbon version, the ‘Council shall adopt 
decisions which shall deﬁ ne the approach of the Union of a particular 
matter of a geographical or thematic nature. Member States shall ensure 
that their national policies conform to the Union positions’. Although it 
offers the criterion that Union positions shall refer to a particular matter 
of a geographical or thematic nature,48 the TEU lacks a detailed deﬁ nition 
of this instrument. The wording of the Lisbon Treaty in respect of Union 
positions is identical to the provision on common positions in the Nice 
Treaty.
When turning to the question whether Union positions are binding 
on the Member States, it has to be mentioned that Article 29 TEU still 
falls short of offering the amount of information that the provisions on 
operational decisions do (Article 28 Lisbon version). The wording of Arti-
cle 29 TEU that Member States ‘shall ensure that their national policies 
conform to the Union positions’ appears not to be as strict as the wording 
of Article 28 (2) TEU that stresses that operational decisions ‘shall com-
mit the Member States in the provisions they adopt and in the conduct 
of their activity’. However, there is still not enough substance to conclude 
that the difference in wording of operational decisions and Union posi-
tions should indicate, as an actus contrarius argument, that Union posi-
tions are not binding on the Member States. Rather, the use of the term 
‘conformity’ implies that the Member States are under a negative as well 
as a positive obligation in respect of the conduct of their national foreign 
policy. On one hand, they are under the negative obligation to refrain 
from adopting any national foreign policy measures that would hinder 
the effect of existing or already anticipated Union positions. On the other 
47  See Hillion and Wessel (n 43) 84.
48  Before the Treaty of Amsterdam, neither the Single European Act nor the Treaty of Maas-
tricht offered even this rather vague condition.
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hand, they are under the positive obligation to modify their national for-
eign policy decisions that run counter to Union positions.49 
In sum, Council decisions deﬁ ning actions to be undertaken by the 
Union, as well as Union positions, are binding on the Member States. 
Their binding nature is enhanced by the principle of systematic coopera-
tion and the principle of loyal cooperation. Once a Union decision has 
been adopted by the Council, the Member States are on the one hand un-
der the obligation to actively support the Union’s policy and on the other 
hand to refrain from any unilateral or multilateral action that could un-
dermine the Union decision. Hence, the Member States are constrained 
in the conduct of their national foreign policies by secondary CFSP provi-
sions once they have adopted these provisions through the Council.
C. International agreements 
The Treaty of Lisbon explicitly states that Member States are bound 
by agreements concluded by the European Union in the sphere of the 
common foreign and security policy (Article 216 (2) TFEU in conjunc-
tion with Article 37 TEU). But what does this imply? What impact does 
the Union’s competence to enter into international agreements have on 
the Member States? Will the Member States lose sovereignty to conclude 
international agreements with foreign and security implications once the 
Union has exercised its treaty-making competence, or will they retain the 
autonomy to do so, albeit with some constraints on the conduct of their 
national foreign policies? 
Before the impact of Article 216 TEU on the Member States’ national 
foreign and security policies is assessed, we should analyse whether Ar-
ticle 216 TFEU is introducing something new or if the Member States are 
already bound by international agreements concluded by the European 
Union. The starting point for this analysis is the current Article 24 TEU of 
the Treaty of Nice. So far, the Council has concluded three types of inter-
national agreements in relation to the conduct of ESDP missions, includ-
ing status of mission and status of force agreements with the host state, 
agreements with third parties, contributing personnel or assets, and ﬁ -
nally agreements regulating exchange of information.50 Article 24 Lisbon 
version does not explicitly state that international agreements concluded 
by the Council on behalf of the Union are binding on the Member States. 
However, the wording of Article 24 (5) TEU, according to which agree-
ments are not binding on a Member State that has made constitutional 
49  See Hillion and Wessel (n 43) 85.
50  A Sari, ‘The Conclusion of International Agreements by the European Union in the Con-
text of the ESDP’ (2008) 57 ICLQ 55.
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reservations in the Council, only makes sense if agreements are bind-
ing on Member States that have not made any reservations.51 Hence, 
international agreements of the European Union are already binding on 
Member States, and the Treaty of Lisbon is not introducing something 
entirely new in this respect. Nevertheless, the Treaty of Lisbon puts more 
emphasis on this fact. 
But how far does this binding character go? Are the Member States 
still competent to conclude international agreements in the ﬁ eld of com-
mon foreign and security policy or have they transferred their treaty-
making capacity to the Union and are prevented to conclude interna-
tional agreements with a foreign and security implication? According to 
Article 3 (2) TFEU, the Union has 
exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international agree-
ment when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the 
Union or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal 
competence, or in so far as its conclusion may affect common rules 
or alter their scope. 
But it can be questioned if agreements in the ﬁ eld of common for-
eign and security policy are likely to fulﬁ l these requirements. Article 24 
(1) TEU Lisbon version excludes the adoption of legislative acts from the 
scope of the common foreign and security policy. Hence, an international 
agreement in the sphere of the CFSP cannot be provided for in a legislative 
act of the Union. Furthermore, it is not obvious how the other conditions 
of exclusivity of Article 3 (2) TFEU can be met in a CFSP context.52 Hence, 
the Member States are not prevented from entering into international 
agreements, even if the Union has already exercised its competence. 
The Member States might not have lost their treaty-making capacity 
to the European Union, but they could still be constrained by interna-
tional agreements concluded by the Union in the conduct of their nation-
al foreign and security policy. Some go as far as to argue that EU agree-
ments form an integral part of Union law by applying the Haegeman53 
doctrine which has been developed by the ECJ in respect of Community 
agreements to EU agreements.54 Hence, they conclude that international 
agreements by the European Union would be able to bind the Member 
States in the same way as secondary CFSP provisions bind them.55 The 
51  See Hillion and Wessel (n 43) 99.
52  See Hillion and Wessel (n 43) 104.
53  Case C-181/173 R&V Haegeman v Belgian State [1974] ECR 449.
54  See Hillion and Wessel (n 43) 105; D Thym, ‘Die völkerrechtlichen Verträge der Europä-
ischen Union’ (2006) 66 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 
900.
55  See Thym (n 54) 901.
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Haegeman doctrine has been developed in relation to the Community le-
gal order and one thus has to be careful before transferring its reasoning 
to the common foreign and security policy which is still treated separately 
from the Union under the Lisbon Treaty that is merging the former pil-
lars of the European Union (Article 24 (1) subparagraph 2 TEU Lisbon 
version). Even if one does not apply the Haegeman doctrine, Article 216 
TFEU, in conjunction with the principle of loyal cooperation as expressed 
in Article 24 (3) TEU Lisbon version, demands the Member States not 
to undermine existing EU policies. Thus, in cases where the Union has 
already concluded international agreements, they are not supposed to 
inﬂ uence or even prevent the outcome of the agreement by engaging with 
others, or to adopt unilateral decisions.56 Furthermore, when the Union 
has not yet concluded international agreements but is anticipating do-
ing so in line with an established Union policy and might have already 
entered into negotiations with third parties, the Member States have to 
refrain from concluding international agreements or from adopting uni-
lateral acts that would run counter to the Union policy in order to protect 
the CFSP acquis.
In sum, although the Member States still have the competence to 
conclude international agreements and to adopt unilateral decisions, 
they are not entirely free to do as they please. The limits are set by EU 
law obligations.57 As a consequence of the principle of loyal cooperation, 
the Member States are not supposed to disturb the functioning of the in-
stitutional mechanisms and they are not entitled to adopt decisions that 
might undermine existing Union policies or that might even conﬂ ict with 
primary or secondary CFSP law.58
V. Conclusion 
This analysis of the provisions of the common foreign and security 
policy leads to the conclusion that the European Member States are con-
strained by the Union’s common foreign and security policy in the con-
duct of their national foreign policy. Whenever the European Union has 
previously been engaged in a topic related to the common foreign and 
security policy and has adopted a Council decision, the Member States 
are bound by this joint action/Council decision deﬁ ning the action to be 
undertaken by the Union or by this common position/Union position, 
56  A Dashwood, ‘The Relationship between the Member States and the European Union/
European Community’ (2004) 41 CML Rev 373.
57  B De Witte, ‘The Emergence of a European System of Public International Law: the EU 
and its Member States as Strange Subjects’ in J Wouters, A Nollkaemper and E de Wet 
(eds), The Europeanisation of International Law (TMC Asser Press, The Hague 2008) 46.
58  See De Witte (n 57) 46.
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as indicated by the wording and the systematic context of Articles 28 
and 29 TEU Lisbon version. The binding nature of this secondary CFSP 
law is underlined by the primary CFSP principles of sincere cooperation 
(Article 32 TEU Lisbon version) and loyal cooperation (Article 24 TEU Lis-
bon version). The principle of loyal cooperation, containing the positive 
obligation for the Member States to actively support the Union’s foreign 
and security policy, as well as the negative obligation to refrain from any 
action that might run counter to the Union’s CFSP acquis, seems to be 
of greater signiﬁ cance than the principle of sincere cooperation that asks 
the Member States to consult one another in order for a Union decision to 
be made. In respect of international agreements concluded by the Union, 
the principles of loyal cooperation ask the Member States to refrain from 
inﬂ uencing the effectiveness of the agreement by concluding agreements 
themselves or by adopting unilateral decisions.
However, the Member States are only constrained once they have 
voted in the Council and once the Council has adopted a secondary CFSP 
measure or concluded an international agreement on behalf of the Eu-
ropean Union. However, no obligation exists to create a common policy 
in respect of certain issues.59 Thus, the Member States can avoid any 
constraints on the conduct of their national foreign policy by simply not 
putting a topic on the agenda of the Council, even if the topic concerns an 
issue of general interest to the Union. Furthermore, once a topic comes 
onto the Council agenda, they have the possibility to prevent a Council 
decision from being adopted. Although qualiﬁ ed majority voting has been 
introduced in the common foreign and security policy, the requirement 
for unanimity is still the rule. The Council can only act by qualiﬁ ed ma-
jority in cases where a former decision has been based on a unanimous 
vote (Article 31 TEU Lisbon version / Article 23 TEU Nice version). Mat-
ters falling under the European security and defence policy and having 
military or defence implications always require unanimous voting (Article 
31 (4) TEU Lisbon version / Article 23 (2) TEU Nice version). Lastly, past 
practice has shown that the scope of joint actions and common positions 
is usually limited and thus leaves enough space for national policies.60 
Under the Treaty of Lisbon, the existence of secondary CFSP norms will 
probably continue to not completely block the unilateral policy initiatives 
of the Member States in areas where the Union is also active.
The question if Member States can be constrained by the Union’s 
common foreign and security policy when no secondary CFSP norms 
have been adopted so far is more difﬁ cult to answer. According to the 
59  K Lenaerts and T Corthaut, ‘Of Birds and Hedges: the Role of Primacy in Invoking Norms 
of EU Law’ (2006) 31 EL Rev 301.
60  See Hillion and Wessel (n 43) 85.
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principle of loyal cooperation, the Member States are under the negative 
obligation to refrain from any action which runs counter to the interests 
of the EU or is likely to infringe its effectiveness. They have to respect 
the CFSP acquis. The acquis of the common foreign and security policy, 
however, is largely built up of secondary CFSP norms and international 
agreements. In consequence, the principle of loyal cooperation usually 
needs a substantive provision in order to assert its constraining inﬂ uence 
on the Member States. However, once the CFSP acquis is build up, the 
principle of loyal cooperation asks the Member States not to adopt deci-
sions that might undermine existing Union policies or that might even 
conﬂ ict with primary or secondary CFSP law.
In sum, the European Member States are constrained in the conduct 
of their national foreign policy by primary and secondary CFSP law, but 
only once secondary CFSP provisions have been adopted. But how strong 
are these constraints and how can they be enforced? The Lisbon Treaty 
does not introduce jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in re-
spect of the common foreign and security policy (Article 24 (2) TEU). It is 
for the Council and the High Representative to ensure the compliance of 
Member States with the principles of the common foreign and security 
policy (Article 24 (3) TEU Lisbon version). Hence, the Lisbon Treaty still 
falls short of introducing a strong enforcement mechanism. As a result, 
the constraints of the CFSP on the Member States appear to be legally 
weak. In a political sense, it might be more difﬁ cult for the Member States 
to pursue national policies that run counter to Union policies. 
However, the constraints are of a legal nature and therefore indi-
cate that some transfer of power from the Member States to the Union 
in the ﬁ eld of the common foreign and security policy has taken place. 
In consequence, the Member States are not just using the CFSP forum 
to exercise their national competences; the common foreign and security 
policy is not just about the pooling of sovereignty by the Member States 
to enhance their national external capacity, but rather about a trans-
fer and a loss of sovereignty. Hence, the CFSP has developed into more 
than just the sum of its Member States. The legal constraints put on the 
Member States are probably not yet strong enough for the conclusion to 
be reached that they are ‘semi-sovereign’ or not ‘fully sovereign states’.61 
The Member States remain the dominant actors of the common foreign 
and security policy that can inﬂ uence what is put on its agenda.  As a 
result, no clear line can be drawn between the competences of the Un-
ion and those of the Member States in the common foreign and security 
policy.62 Perhaps it is more appropriate to talk about ‘mixed sovereignty’, 
61  See De Witte (n 57) 49.
62  A Mignolli, ‘The EU’s Powers of External Relations’ (2002) The International Spectator 109.
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indicating that at the international level external capacity is sometimes 
exercised by the Union, sometimes by the Member States and sometimes 
by both acting together.63 Hence, in respect of the relationship between 
the European Member States and the European Union in the ﬁ eld of the 
common foreign and security policy, as well as in the European security 
and defence policy, the Treaty of Lisbon does not clarify the situation 
and does not offer an approach different from that offered by the Treaty 
of Nice. 
63  See De Witte (n 57) 50.
